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VS. 
ShLT LJd(E COUNTY I 
Dcfcnd<.nt u.nc 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NA'l'URE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15311 
This is o.n action for settling damage to a garage, 
allegedly caused by a Salt Lake County storm drain. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\'IEE COURT 
A jury trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs 
in the amount of $15,645.00 which was later amended by the 
court to the amount of $17,583.47. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial. 
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ST!.'J u.;,~;:·r OF Fl\C'!'~_; 
In about l9S7 S2lt Lake County in~lallcd a sto1m d~ain­
agc systc;,, ocross rc:<ll propu Ly knm·.·n ilS the Eet~_: L. Olyn'[!lls 
Heights SulYlivision. 
building lot in the subdivision. In the winter of 19~9-GO 
a house was constructed upon the lot. The plaintiff was 
aware of the existence of the storm drain and its general 
location along the south of his property, but didn't J;nmv 
exactly ~here it ran. (Record G9). 
For the first ten years that plaintiffs lived in the 
house the~ had no problem with foundation settling. (Eecord 
70). In the spring of 1971, hov.·cver, plaintiff noticed some 
small cracks in his garage. They did not appear critical, 
so he ignored them. (Record 71). 
In the spring of 1972 plaintiff noticed that the cracks 
had 1·:idencd. He wondered if the cracking could have some-
thing to do with the county storm drain, so he called Salt 
Lake County Flood Control. A few days later he called 
again and was told that an inspection had been made and 
that no correlation could be found between the cracks and 
the storm drain. (Record 72). 
In the spring of 1973 the cracks had further widened. 
The plaintiff again called Salt Lake County. Again, Salt 
Lake County inspected and could find no correlation between 
-2-
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lhc ~lJlGLi~fs' proLlcm and the storm drain. (Record 73). 
In aC:cJition, the door bc::cillne more 
difficult to opcrutc. In !1a; of 1974 plaintiff again talked 
to S;:.J t L~'kc County pc::J:sonneJ, but "received no satisfaction." 
(Hecord 73). 
Throu'Jhout the sumn~er of 1974 plaintiff kept a close 
eye on tl!e settling problcm. He consultc:;d with a!l expert 
who thoug~l the:; proble~ was probably in&Cesuate footings. 
In August Gf 1974 plaintiff hired a contractor to dig along 
the side of his garage to check the footings. The contrac-
tor found the ground around the footings to be wet. Further 
investigation revealed that the storm drain was leaking. 
On August 30, 1974 plaintiff gave written notice to 
Salt Lake County. Plaintiff then brought this action on the 
theories of nuisance and negligence. 
ARGUHEN'l' 
POINT ONE. TEIS CLAD! IS BARRED BY UTAH 
CODE l,NNOTi\TED §63-30-13 (1967). 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety c1,·1ys after the cause of action 
arises; 
A cause of action arises the moment all of the elements 
of the cause of action are present. In a negligence case the 
clcr.Knts arc: 
-3-
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1. a duty, 
2. a br~ach of th~ duty (ncgli~cncc), 
3. proximate cause, and 
Prosser, Law of Torts (4th Ed. 1971) §30 at 143. 
This Court held in O'llair v. Kouvalis, 23 Utcll1 2d 35'), 
356, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (1970): 
A cause of action or right of action arises 
the moment an action may be maintained to enforce 
it, and the statute of limitations is thc;n set in 
motion. 
In the case at bench all the elements of the cause of action 
existed in th~ spring of 1971 when the cracking first appeared. 
Consolidated Irr. Dist., 119 P.2d 717 (Cal. 1941). In that 
case damage to real property had occurred as a result of a 
leaking canal. The plaintiff had failed to file its claim 
with the irrigation district 1·1iU1in 'Lhe time fixed by the 
claim statute. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff 
the court held: 
Damage such as that caused by seepage, it 
is said, can occur so slowly that the injury 
would not be discovered before the statutory 
period lapsed. The answer to this argument 
lies in the fact that the claim provision as 
a whole indicates no intention tlnt it is to 
have a limited application, for the opcniny 
clause includes within its scope any claim for 
damage or injury to property resulting from 
"any" dangerous or de:Lective condition brought 
about by the district in the operation of its 
worh;. I·:Jwre __!he_ U l'le <1nd c:_:_tc:n ~!_j,J~j u n·_~2:~ 
-4-
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119 P.2c1 at 721. 
In the present cas<:> the elements of the cause of action 
all existed in the spring of 1971; the plaintiff discovered 
damage at that time; the notice was not filed until August 
30, 1974, long after the 90 statute applicable to governrnental 
entities had lapsed. 
This Court held as early as 1883 that a statute of 
limitations is not tolled by the plaintiff's ignorance of 
his cau2e of action except in cases of fraud or concealment. 
In Dec v. Hyland, 3 Utah 308, 3 P.388 (1883), the plaintiff's 
horse disappeared. More than three years later the plaintiff 
saw the horse in the possession of the defendant. The 
defendant had purchased the horse shortly after the time 
when the horse disappeared. In affirming a judgment for the 
defendant, the court said: 
Where there is no proof of fraud on the part 
of the defendant, the general rule is that the 
time of limitations runs from the time of the 
conunission of the wrongful act, or the right of 
action accrues, and not from the time of the knowl-
edge of the act by the plaintiff, there being no 
proof of any wrongful conduct on the part of the 
defendant by means of which that knowledge is 
conceal~d from the plaintiff. 
3 Utah at 314, 3 P. at 389-90. 
This rule was reaffirmed by this court as recently as 
-5-
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(1974). That cose involved the sale of securities sixteen 
years prior to the action. Justice llcnroicl, spci1kj IVJ for the 
unanimous court held: 
[P]laintiff clair's its decedent hiJcl no J:nov;l-
edge of such transfer and hence the stututc of 
limitations would not start to run until discovery, 
and knowledge thereof. 
'l'he facts belie and defeot such an argument. 
No fraud is alleged or shown. Nothing is reflected 
to indicate low blows, hidden microphones, smoke-
filled roo0s or deception. 
522 P.2d at 710. 
The legisla~~re has modified this rule, by statute, in 
cases of fraud, mistake, taking or injuring of personal 
property, and medical malpractice to allow the statute to 
be tolled until the cause of action is discovered. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-26 (1977); Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1977). 
Some jurisdictions have also adopted this "discovery 
rule" by judicial decree. 
Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have 
adopted the discovery rule in the narrow fact situation in-
volving medical malpractice cases v~1ere a foreign object 
is left in a patient's body. Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 
2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968). The reason most courts have 
given for adopting this narrow exception is that the problems 
of proof are minimized in foreign object cases since foreign 
objects do not normally find their way into people's bodies 
-G-
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except in ~;urqcr~'. :c;cconrJl~,, in this type of malpractice 
Cu,~C: the :acl that climugc is occurring is generally inherently 
(U.J. 1961); EilJ:i_n_qc~ \'. Sist.0rs of ~'erc:y, 389 P.2d 224, 281 
(Ic"iu. 1%4). 
Some courts have extended this discovery rule to other 
types of medical malpractice, and a few have extended it to 
all types of professional malpractice on the theory that 
a person of ordinary education is not capable of knowing 
malpractice when it has occurred and may, therefore, be ex-
cused from filing his suit until he discovers the malpractice. 
For example in Peters v. Simmons, 552 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wash. 
1976) the Washington Supreme Court held that the discovery 
rule applied to legal malpractice for the following reason: 
The primary resaon for extending and apply-
ing the rule is because the consumer of profes-
sion2l services frequently does not have the 
means or ability to discovery professional mal-
practice. 
The \iasbington Court has, nevertheless, retained the 
traditional rule in ordinary tort cases. Messes v. Shannon, 
397 P. 2d 846 (~Jash. 1964). 
Similarly, in Neal v. Magna, Olney, Levy, Cathcart, & 
Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421 (Cal. 1971) the California court adopted 
the discovery rule as applied to legal malpractice but speci-
fically stated: 
-7-
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In ordinary tort cmcJ conu·,,ct o.ct i CJIIO:, U1c 
statute of ]imitation~, it is true, 0c0in~ to run 
upon the occurre:ncc of the L1o:l clcn:c.nt c.•;,,c·nt iiil 
to the causo of action. Tlw pJ ,; int i.f f' '' i r;J·or-
ance of the cousc of Jctic~o; o·r-iri·~--i-c',,-I1tTt.v 
of the \•TOJlC~clocr I (IOC53 nol:toTl-tT1~- ;~:c-,;c\.~i~Z·--:-·-~ (Emphu.sls acldCd-:-) _______________ --------
491 P.2d at 428. 
In Carlson v. Ray Geophysical Division, 481 P.2d 327 
(r1ont. 1971), the Montana Court held: 
[T)he fact that a person entitled to an action 
has no knowledge of his right to sue, or of the 
facts out of which his right arises, does not, as 
a gencr~l rule, prevent the running of the statute, 
or postpone the conm1enccmcnt of the per icd of limi-
tation, until he discovers the facts or learns of 
his right thereunder. 
481 P.2d at 329. 
Certainly, any time that a plaintiff is foreclosed from 
suing due to a statute of limitations, he may claim that an 
injustice has resulted. The legislature hils balanced this 
danger, however, against the possible injustice that may 
result from stale and fraudulent claims that are difficult 
to defend against. 
Furthermore, if the discovery rule should be applied 
to any statute of limitations, it should not be applied to 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Host statutes of limitation 
cut off a right existing at common law because of the passage 
of time. Conversely, the Governmental Immunity Act creates 
a right, not existing at common law, upon certain conditions. 
This court held in Scarborouc;h v. Granite School Distdct, 
-8-
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:031 P.:!cl ~80, 482 (Utah l97'i): 
The Sc!Jc,oJ District is a political subdivi-
sicJll of lhe: c;tatr_:. 'll"~l:· fore, it I'IOuld norrcally 
be n,-,,r,uno fr'-ld :;ui t; c':Jc) the riqht to sue: is an 
exception cro~tcd by statute. 0c have consis-
tent lJ' hcJrl tl1i"t v.'hcrc a caus0 of action is 
biJ:~ccl upon ii :Jtc1tntc, full complianc.:c \'lith its 
rr'cjuir'ci~~''ntc; is a concJi tion precedent to the 
ri r_;l1t to muintain a suj_ l. 
The le~islature balanced the possible injustice of 
barring legitimate claims against the needs of governmental 
entities and enacted a statute which creates a right of 
action if a claim is filed ·v1ithin 90 daJ•s a.fter the cause of 
action arises. The legislature created no exception. None 
should be created by this court. 
POINT T\:0. EVEl-l Di'WER THE "DISCOVLRY RULE" 
THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED. 
If this court were to extend the discovery rule to 
ordinary nuisance actions, this verdict still could not 
stand. The discovery rule as usually stated is that the 
limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff 
discovered or sho~ld have discovered that he had a cause of 
action. 
Here the plaintiff discovered damage in 1971. He 
suspected that the county drain waS the cause in 1972. He 
became even more suspicious in 1973. He did not dig along 
his foundution until the sunm1er of 1974. 
Surely the issue of "should have discovered" is, at 
best, a jury issue. The trial court refused to submit this 
-9-
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issue to the jury. 
POHJT Til FEE. TilE LE!II: It;G ST01'J'i SE\ICP, \,'1\S 
l\ "LA'l'ENT D:CFLCT." 
The Utah Governmental Imrtunity l\cl Wilives yuJermncnL<ll 
immunity for defects in pubU c improvcrt,cnts in Utah Code 
Ann. § 6 3-3 0-9. That section ulso provides, however: 
Act. 
Immunity is not waived for latent defective con-
ditions. 
This court has never interpreted this provision of the 
This pro~ision of Utah law is also apparently unique 
among tort clai~s acts, and there are no cases from other 
jurisdictions providing guidunce. In other contexts some 
courts define latent conditions as those which are "not 
discoverable by reasonable inspection." Other courts hold 
that a latent defect is one which is discoverable by proper 
inspection but is not superficially discernible or plainly 
apparent to the eye. Owensby v. Jones, 136 S.E.2d 451, 456 
(Ga. App. 1964). 
Webster defines latent as: 
lying hidden and undeveloped within a person or 
thing, as a quality or power, as yet concealed; 
unrevealed. 
l'i'ebster's l'Jew Twenbeth Century Dictionary (2d ed. 1957). 
Salt Lake County's position is that the legislature, in 
preserving immunity for latent defective conditions, had in 
mind situations exactly like that found in the present case. 
-10-
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'l'l1c storrct c~roin Ho::; in operation 14 years before any problem 
aroc:rc (fro~' l9S7 to 1971). Even then it 1·1as over three 
drain IIC>S n.udc. 
In Salt Lake County and throughout the State, there are 
l!unurcd:o of miles of storm C:rains. Some are new, modern 
construcLion; others are old. Many, like the one in this 
case, have functioned adequately for many years but may 
begin leaking. Some can be inspected by craHling through 
them, although this may not disclose leaks. Others are too 
small for a man to enter. The only way that Salt Lake 
County could avoid possiole liability is to dig up and re-
place all the old storm drains in the county at horrendous 
expense. Because of the duration of a governmental entity's 
existence, and because of the continual turnover in managing 
personnel, the legislature provided that latent defects 
would remain in the area of governmental immunity. 
No better example of a latent defective condition could 
be found than a buried storm drain, which operates perfectly 
satisfactorily for 14 years and then begins to cause damage 
by slowly seeping water underground. 
The plaintiffs contend that they should be excused from 
filing a notice of claim from 1971 when the damage began 
until 1974. If they are excused, it is only because the 
defect was latent and, therefore, not reasonably discoverable. 
-11-
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If the defect \'.'ilS lutc.:nt, the claim is barred; if it \Ja:; not 
latent, the time for disco\'ery slJc,ulu not JJL tollul. 
POI!iT FOUJZ. 'IllL: COCF'J E!<l~l~D r;; c;l,J:'.1TTTI ;:c: 
TillS C7~SE 0:' THL Tlll~OJG (1]' STFlCT LU1UlLlTY. 
The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
A nuisance is a cond:Lti(Jn, not an ilCl: or fil.il-
ure to act on the port of tlw person rc:-i]JOnsiblc 
for the condition. If thcc: \.<ronsful COl1c1ition e:-:ists, 
and the pel son char<Jcs therc· .. ·itl, ic; rCLJ on:c;iblc.: for 
its existence, he; is Li0blc for the rc:"''ltinq 
da~1ac;eo: to othel·si'lTi:-:]c)-;::(1\''ilc-r;;:;·~-h<cvc-: u~ ·cl-tlK:_ 
~~l~c~~-I~~P~;~~~.:~}~~~~~!J:r~~~Ef.· 6c·-~~~~~::~~~"~~7~ ~;f~f~H ~n 
for-----a-il0-iS-~j 1~C c_-c~4D)10t -f)i-CYG·; ~~J tE"-cr· b-~~~~h-(~\7.i-1lCTtlhl·l-__ _ 
~~~lt ·-'2.~=-_no-nc_CL i ~~-:!C~- on u~;;-jJ'irt ~[,_Li!lf:: de:- c.:J ;-..:: 
A nuisance does not rest on the degree of 
care used, for that presents a question of negli-
gence:', but on the degree of d0n0er existing even 
with the best of care, the question of cure or 
want of care is not involved. Thus, a person 
who crcc:atcs or Etain'c,,.:.ns a nuisance is liable for 
the rcc:sulting injury to others, without rcc:qard to 
the deqree of care or sl:iJ 1 o:crcisc.·d-h~-TlTmto­
avold the-in l ur-~~ and--noh:i tf1stiot-;:)Cf:L!i(i --Cri0~:-he-· 
exercises rezLsonab~LeC,.r ordi-n00> co.rean2;-~S-JZill, 
or eyen the highest possiilie dc'qre-e()Tccirc.--
A nuisance may or may not be bascc:d in the 
negligent act of thcc: one creating it. However, it 
frequently is the conscc:quence of negligence, or the 
samcc: acts or omissions which constitute ncc:;ligcc:nce 
which may give rise to a nuisance. A lawful action 
may become a nuisance by reason of its negligence 
performance. (Emphasis added). 
This instruction to the cc:ffect that negligcc:nce is not 
required in a nuisance is totally mislcc:ading to the jury and 
clearly erroneous under Utah law. 
-12-
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111 lJ1C Cc 
llLd: 2 i 2fcS, :,(,8 P.2c1 70 (l'J71) In that case this court 
cj leu J >'-~(_P 1 Pro:;~: for the proposition: 
J.ny of three· ty;A·:~ of conclc;ct may result in 
Jjd]Ji lit)' fo1· a pri'vatc nuis<,rJCC. By fur the 
grcc< Lu.· nc.L·lJ'-'r of such nuisc r~ccs are intentional. 
Today liability for nuisance may rest upon 
an inlc·nlional invasion of lhc plaintiff's in-
terests, or a negligent one, or conCuct ~hich 
is abno~~al and out of place in its surroundings, 
and so falls fairly within the principle of 
strict liability. 
2G Utub 2cl at 291-92, 488 P.2d at 745 citina Prosser, Lm·1 of 
'l'orts (3cl Eel.), Sec. 88, pp. 594-595. 
The court also cited the Restatement of Torts as to 
this issuc. The Rcstatcmcnt provides: 
§822. General Rule. 
The acto~ is liable in an action for damages 
for a non-trespassory invasion of another's inter-
est in the private use and enjoyment of land if, 
(a) the other has property rights and privi-
leges in respect to the use or enjo;rment 
interfered with; and 
(b) the im·asion is substantial; and 
(c) tho actor's conduct is a legal cause of 
the invasion; and 
(d) the invasion is either 
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or 
-13-
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(ii) unintcnL.ionaJ c:;rjrl ()thr"r· .. ·i~;' 
~Gf(_,--J.JJJ ___ :_f _( __ t_l_l_(_t • I• -~Jr)':r 1 J 
l' 
liilLll 1 L,· ; r,r r:c c: 1 i Jl_l.-_, J ~- r_:}: Lc ;-- ;-, 
or uJ t1 (:h 1, ,-; j-(J(-Jll 
(EmrJ!J~,·,.l.s -aclucli .-) 
{_'(_;);(I IJC L. 
In clarifying this rule, the P.cc;ta!c.~·':'_J('fl_l:_ comments suyc:: 
There is no general rule of lill·: thi1t OJW acts 
at his ]Jeril in res;xci... to intcrfcJ-ulcc:_ 1·1i t·h 
another's use or enjoywrnt of his lund, i:nc1, thccrc-
forc, 1·1hcn such interfcJ:cnccs ore !A:rcly i.1ccic1cnL1l, 
the actor is not liable for causing th~m. It is 
only ~~en unintentional invasions are caused by 
another's conduct which is negli <jCn t, rc"cklcc:s or 
ultrahazardous that the law subjcci...s the actor to 
lio.I.Jility. 
Restatement of To:cts, §822, cornn:cnt at 233 (1939). 
Defenda~t could have been found liable to plaintiffs, 
therefore: 
(l) If the harm was intentional or the activity 
undertaken with knowledge that damage was substnntially 
certain to follow, and the invasion was unreasonai.Jle. Or, 
(2) If the conduct of Salt Lake County was negligent. 
Or, 
(3) If the activity was of such a nature as to fall 
fairly within the area of strict liability. 
The issue of strict liability was discussed by this 
court in the case of Stevens v. \i'onq, 123 Uto.h 309, 259 
P. 2d 586 (1953). There the plaintiff had occupied the lo~er 
portion of a building. The defendant occupied the space 
directly above. The defendant's water pipe sprung a leak, 
water seeped into the plaintiff's ceiling causing large 
portions of plaster to fall. 
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'l'J,c l'l, · ;,1 1 f ;,_, cudlc ncicd lhilt strict lii1bili ty should 
Th0 coult distinyuishcd a Californiil case which 
applied stricL liability to the drilling of an oil well 
in the follo·.1i nrJ lanCjUiJ·~·~: 
That cuse involved the drilling of an oil well 
near a residence unC the drillers knc· or sho~ld 
havE: knovrn th2:t no matter hm·1 careful tJ-.ey 1-1ere in 
their opcrc,tions thiAt clamago might ensue fror-1 the 
very natur~_e of the rnuttcr they 1-1ere dealing 1·.>ith. 
The exrJericncc o;: rnunkind has not tauc;ht this to 
be true of water in pipes. 
123 Utah at 314, 259 P.2d at 588. 
Similarly, the "experience of mankind" has not taught 
that the opcrntion of a storm drain is likely to cause 
danWCJe. 
CONCLUSION 
In adopting the Go1•ernmental Immunity Act, the legis-
lature created a right of action which did not exist at 
conu~on law. It did so provided certain conditions were met 
and procedures were follo1-1ed by the claimant. One of these 
conditions is that a claim be filed within 90 days after the 
cause of action arises. 
It is clear that a cause of action arises or begins to 
exisl the moment ull four elements of the cause (duty, 
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neglis;ence, proximate cause and dc_u,,i:lge) are prcsc:nl. In 
this case all the elements I·IE::re present in the spri nCJ of 
1971. The notice was filed in the late sun~er of 1974. 
The Legislatt're balanced the rights of injured persons 
against the needs of governmental entities anc1 wrote a 
statute without a provision for tolling until the cause of 
damage is discovered. It is the Court's duty to implement 
that statute; not to write a new one of its own. 
As a California court held in FidelL!J' and Deposit Co. 
v. Claude Fisher Co., 327 P.2d 78 (Cal.App. 1958): 
Statutes of limitation and the like, pre-
scribing deiinite periods of time Wlthin which 
actions rnLy be brought or certain steps taken 
are, of necessity, adamant rather than flexible 
in nature. Such statutes are upheld and enforced 
regardless of personal hardship, and they are 
favored by the courts. 
cited with approval, Roosendaal Const. & Min. Corp. v. Holman, 
2 8 Utah 2 d 3 9 6 , 50 3 P . 2 d 4 4 6 ( 19 72 ) . 
Even if it were properly within the court's domain to 
adopt a "discovery rule'', it should not be adopted in cases 
such as this. The purposes of a prompt notice may not 
oubveigh the burden put upon plaintiffs in a case where a 
surgeon leaves a foreign object in a patient's body. There 
the lack of problems of proof and the inherent difficulty in 
discovering the malpractice may outweigh the need to bar old 
claims. Perhaps this Court should go as far as the California 
court and adopt the discovery rule for all professional 
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rnnlpracticc. Dut certainly the rule should not be adopted 
in Grdlnnry n~yligcncc cnscs. 
Even if the discovery rule is adopted for defective 
structure ca~cs, it can only apply to latent defects, since 
patent defects nrc readily discoverable by diligence. The 
Legislature has not seen fit to waive governmental immunity 
for latent defects. 
Third, even if the discovery rule were applied in this 
case, the issue of when the defect "should have been discovered" 
should have gone to the jury. 
Last, the law is clear that this is not a proper case for 
the application of strict liability. 
Defendants request a reversal. 
Respectft,lly submitted this day of December, 1977. 
SNOI·I, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By :::;u::HiJ CJMADQ) 
Scott Daniels 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hailed tvJO copies of the fore qoinq ''I~l-''-'llant' s 
Brief to Thomas A. Duffin, Attorn~y at Low, SJO T0n 
Broadv1ay Building, Salt Lake City, Ut-zth 84101, postac)C' 
prepaid, this ~day of ~ , 197 J_· 
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